The Narrative Construction of Reality === > [!tldr] Tags > #type/journalArticle > [!info] Meta Data >**FirstAuthor**:: [[Bruner, Jerome]] > **Title**:: The Narrative Construction of Reality > **Year**:: 1991 > **Citekey**:: [[1991_bruner]] > **itemType**:: journalArticle > **Journal**:: *Critical Inquiry* > **Volume**:: 18 > **Issue**:: 1 > **ISSN**:: > > [!Cite] > Bruner Jerome, « The Narrative Construction of Reality », _Critical Inquiry_, 1991, vol. 18, no 1. > > %%[@1991_bruner]%% > **URL**:: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1343711 . > > **Related**:: . > > **Attachment**::[PDF](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/QXDGK4CU). --- > [!important] Synthesis > **Contribution**:: > > [!Abstract] >> --- # Note. --- # Annotations%% begin annotations %% ### Imported: 2026-09-24 11:39 am <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Piaget became the spokesman for the classic rationalist tradition by arguing the universality of a series of invariant developmental stages, each with its own set of inherent logical operations that successively and inexorably led the child to construct a mental repre- sentation of the real world akin to that of the detached, dispassionate sci- entist <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > The growth of knowl- edge of "reality" or of the mental powers that enable this growth to occur, the critics argue, is neither unilinear, strictly derivational in a logical sense, nor is it, as it were, "across the board. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Knowledge and skill, rather, are domain specific and, consequently, uneven in their accretion <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > It is a little "reality" of its own that is constituted by the principles and procedures that we use within it <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > The attraction of this view is, of course, that it links man and his knowledge-gaining and knowledge-using capabilities to the culture of which he and his ancestors were active mem <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > ers. But it brings pro- foundly into question not only the universality of knowledge from one domain to another, but the universal translatability of knowledge from one culture to anoth <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > at cultural products, like language and other symbolic sys- tems, mediate thought and place their stamp on our representations of reality <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > name, afterJohn Seely Brown and Allan Collins, of "distributed intelligen <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > most of our knowledge about human knowledge-getting and reality-constructing is drawn from studies of how people come to know the natural or physical world rather than the human or symbolic world. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > So while we have learned a great deal indeed about how we come eventually to construct and "explain" a world of nature in terms of causes, probabilities, space-time manifolds, and so on, we know altogether too lit- tle about how we go about constructing and representing the rich and messy domain of human interaction <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > we organize our experience and our memory of human hap penings mainly in the form of narrative-stories, excuses, myths, rea- sons for doing and not doing, and so on. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Unlike the constructions generated by logical and scientific procedures that can be weeded out by falsification, narrative construc- tions can only achieve "verisimilitude." <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > Narratives, then, are a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and "narrative necessity" rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Eventually it becomes a vain enterprise to say which is the more basic-the mental process or the discourse form that expresses it-for, just as our experience of the natural world tends to imitate the categories of familiar science, so our experience of human affairs comes to take the form of the narratives we use in telling about them. <mark style="background-color: #2ea8e5">Quote</mark> > con- 7. For a fuller, more discursive account of the nature and products of narrative thought, see my Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), and Acts of Mean ing. See also Theodore R. Sarbin, Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct (New York, 198 <mark style="background-color: #2ea8e5">Quote</mark> > See On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > the ten features of narrative. <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 1. Narrative diachronicity. A n <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > narrative is an account of events occur- ring over time. It is irreducibly durative. It may b <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > The time involved, moreover, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, is "human time" rather than abstract or "clock" time.' It is time <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 2. Particularity. Na <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 3. Intentional state entail <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > ent. Narratives are about people acting in a setting, and the happenings that befall them must be relevant to their intentional states while so engaged-to their beliefs, desires, theories, val- ues, and so o <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > hing. For some measure of agency is always present in narrative, and agency presuppose <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > e situation. The loose link between intentional states and subsequent action is the reason why narrative accounts cannot provide causal expla <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > for inter <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > d. Interpretation is concerned with "reasons" for things happening, rather than strictly with their "causes," a matter to which we <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 4. Hermeneutic composa <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > The word hermeneutic implies that there is a text or a text analogue through which somebody has been trying to express a meaning and from which somebody is trying to extract a <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > at there is a difference between what is expressed in the text and what the text might mean, and furthermore that there is no unique solu tion to the task of determining the meaning for this e <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > ility." The telling of a story and its comprehension as a story depend on the human capacity to process knowledge in this interpretive <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > . This is the more surprising since there is compelling evidence to indicate that narrative comprehension is among the earliest powers of mind to appear in the young child and among the most widely used forms of organizing human experien <mark style="background-color: #2ea8e5">Quote</mark> > 15. See, for example, Narratives from the Crib, ed. Katherine Nelson (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), and Bruner, Acts of Meaning. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Interpretation has a long history in biblical exegesis and in jurispru- dence <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > f intention: "why" the story is told how and when it is, and interpreted as it is by inter- locutors caught in different intentional stances themse <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > of background knowledge-of both the storyteller and the listener, and how each interprets the back- ground knowledge of the oth <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > er Hilary Put <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > t, proposes two principles: the first is a "Principle of Benefit of Doubt," the second a "Principle of Reasonable Ignoran <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > e": the first "forbids us to assume that ... experts are factually omniscient," the second that "any speakers are philosophically omniscient (even uncon sciously)."2 <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 5. Canonicity and bre <mark style="background-color: #2ea8e5">Quote</mark> > 24. See Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpreta- tion in Psychoanalysis (New York, 19 <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > often highly conventional and are strongly influenced by narrative traditions. <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > narrative structure in terms of two components-what hap- pened and why it is worth telling. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > notion of irreducible clausal sequences <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 6. Referential <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 7. Genericness <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > en- res seem to provide both writer and reader with commodious and conven tional "models" for limiting the hermeneutic task of making sense of human happenings-ones we narrate to ourselves as well as ones we hear others tell. <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > . But genre is also a form of telling, its sju <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > et. Even if genres specialize in conventionalized human plights, they achieve their effects by using language in a particula <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > n a word, while they may be representations of social ontology, they are also invitations to a particular style of epistem <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > logy. As such, they may have quite as powerful an influence in shaping our modes of thought as they have in creating the realities that their plots de <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 8. Normativeness <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Because its "tellability" as a form of discourse rests on a breach of conventional expectation, narrative is necessarily nor- mative <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > A breach presupposes a norm. T <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > Hayden White and Victor Turner to Paul Ricoeur, to propose that narrative is centrally concerned with cultural legitimacy.35 A <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > The normativeness of narrative, in a word, is not historically or cultur ally terminal. Its form changes with the preoccupations of the age and the circumstances surrounding its produ <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 9. Context sensitivity and negoti <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > it is this very context sensitivity that makes narrative discourse in everyday life such a viable instrument for cultural negotiation. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > You tell your ver- sion, I tell mine, and we rarely need legal confrontation to settle the dif- ference. Principles of charity and presumptions of relevance are balanced against principles of sufficient ignorance and sufficient doubt to a degree one would not expect where criteria of consistency and verification pre- vailed. We seem to be able to take competing versions of a story with a per- spectival grain of salt, much more so than in the case of arguments or proofs <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > I think it is precisely this interplay of perspectives in arriving at "narrative truth" that has led philosophers like Richard Rorty to abandon univocally verificationist views of truth in favor of pragmatic ones.43 Nor is it surpris- ing that anthropologists have increasingly turned away from positivist descriptions of cultures toward an interpretive one in which not objective categories but "meanings" are sought for, not meanings imposed ex hypo- thesi by an outsider, the anthropologist, but ones arrived at by indigenous participants immersed in the culture's own processes for negotiating meaning.44 <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > 10. Narrative accrua <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > Sciences achieve their accrual by deriva- tion from general principles, by relating particular findings to central par- adigms, by couching empirical findings in a form that makes them subsumable under altering paradigms, and by countless other procedures for making science, as the saying goes, "cumulative. <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > insist, the accruals eventually create something variously called a "culture" or a "history" or, more loosely, a "traditio <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > ed.46 Institutions, too, as we know from the innovative work of Eric Hobsbawm, "invent" traditions out of previously ordinary happenings and then endow them with privileged sta- tus. <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > 7 And there are principles of jurisprudence, like stare decisis, that guarantee a tradition by assuring that once a "case" has been interpreted in one way, future cases that are "similar" shall be interpreted and decided equivalently. Insofar as the law insists on such accrual of cases as "prece dents," and insofar as "cases" are narratives, the legal system imposes an orderly process of narrative accr <mark style="background-color: #2ea8e5">Quote</mark> > Michel Foucault's ground-breaking Archeology ofKn <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > be through the imposition of bogus historical-causal entailm <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > coherence by contemporaneity: the belief that things happening at the same time must be connecte <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > What creates a culture, surely, must be a "local" capacity for accruing stories of happenings of the past into some sort of diachronic struc <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > that permits a continuity into the present-in short, to construct a history, a tradition, a legal system, instruments assuring historical continuity if not legitimac <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > It is a sense of belonging to this canonical past that permits us to form our own narratives of deviation while maintaining complicity with the canon <mark style="background-color: #ffd400">Quote</mark> > ic domains of human knowledge and skill and that they are supported and organized by cultural tool kits. If we accept <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > understanding the nature and growth of mind in any set- ting, we cannot take as our unit of analysis the isolated individual opera ting "inside his or her own skin" in a cultural vacuum. Rather, we must <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > human mind cannot express its nascent powers without the enablement of the symbolic systems of culture. While many of <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > other domain that must be widely (though roughly) shared for a culture to operate with requisite effectiveness is the domain of social beliefs and <mark style="background-color: #ff6666">Quote</mark> > procedures %% end annotations %% %% Import Date: 2026-09-24T11:39:09.418+02:00 %%